Analyse der Triebkräfte institutionellen Wandels bei Vorliegen von Moral Hazard oder Hold-up in Vertragsbeziehungen

• Antragsteller: Professor Dominique Demougin, Ph.D.
• Fachliche Zuordnung: Wirtschaftstheorie
• Förderung: Förderung von 2008 bis 2012
• Projektkennung: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Projektnummer 68748992

• Erstellungsjahr: 2012

Zusammenfassung der Projektergebnisse

Keine Zusammenfassung vorhanden

Projektbezogene Publikationen (Auswahl)

• (2009). The Impact of Envy on Relational Employment Contracts. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 72. 2009, Issue 2, pp.766-779.
  Kragl, J. & J. Schmid
  
• (2010). Declining labor shares and bargaining power: An institutional explanation. Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 32.2010, Issue 1, pp. 443-456.
  Bental, B. & Demougin, D.
  
• (2010). Group vs. Individual Performance Pay in Relational Employment Contracts when Workers Are Envious. European Business School Research Paper No. 09-09.
  Kragl, J.
  
• (2010). Technology adoption under hidden information. Journal of Economics, Vol.100. 2010, Issue 1, pp.1-18.
  Demougin, D. & A. Schöttner
  
• (2011). Incentive Contracts and Institutional Labor Market Design. EBS Business School Research Paper No. 13-02.
  Uhlenbrock, J. & M. Gogova
  
• (2011). Individual vs. Relative Performance Pay with Envious Workers and Non-verifiable Performance. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
  Kragl, J.
  
• (2012). Credibility and monitoring: Outsourcing as a Commitment Device. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol.21. 2012, Issue 1, pp. 31-52.
  Bental, B., Deffains, B. & Demougin, D.
  
• (2012). Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits in a Globalized World. European Economic Review
  Demougin, D. & C. Helm
  
• (2012). Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design. European Business School Research Paper No. 12-01
  Kragl, J. and A. Schöttner