The community is more important than the individual: Deliberation, practical rationality, and moral psychology in Cicero's De officiis

• Applicant: Professor Dr. Philipp Brüllmann
• Subject Area: History of Philosophy
• Term: since 2021
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 457116490

Cicero’s perspective on ethical questions is shaped by a strong interest in the relationship between the individual and the community. One of the major concerns of not just his political writings is to emphasise that in case of doubt the community – especially the res publica – is more important than the individual. This thesis of the priority of the community (T) is a core feature of our picture of Cicero’s general outlook. Surprisingly, however, it has never been investigated what exactly T means for his ethical theory. This is where my project comes in. My aim is to offer a systematic investigation of the role that the priority of the community plays in De officiis, Cicero’s most influential work on ethics. I will not just analyse the function that T fulfils in the ‘calculation of duty’, i.e. the procedure of determining what behaviour is appropriate in a specific situation. I will also discuss the conception of practical rationality and moral psychology that T is connected with in De officiis. This adds an important aspect to our picture of a work which, though of great influence in the history of ethics, is today mostly read as a source for the philosophy of the Stoics.The starting point of my reflections is an observation that has not gained the attention it deserves: T does not fit readily into the eudaimonist framework that Cicero refers to in his ethics. Eudaimonism centres around the question of what contributes most to our happiness, i.e. what is in our own interest. T, by contrast, seems to ask us to ignore that question and instead give priority to the interests of the community. Strictly speaking, this problem is not new. It is already present in Aristotle, whose thoroughly eudaimonist ethics contains the idea that it can be right to sacrifice one’s own life for someone else, e.g. when exercising courage. Yet while Aristotle tries to reconcile the case of self-sacrifice with his eudaimonism, this is less clear in De officiis. In fact, I will show that here we find elements of an alternative, non-eudaimonist grounding for T, which is marked, among other things, by a psychology of command and obedience as well as deliberate self-restriction. By exploring those elements and bringing out the tension to the eudaimonist framework, my project offers a whole new view on De officiis. Thus, we can not only better understand what De officiis contributes to Cicero’s own interests as pursued, e.g., in the political writings. We also have a basis for reflections on the relationship between De officiis and the eudaimonist tradition, on the one hand, and modern deontological conceptions, on the other. Such reflections are also part of my project.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants