The Political Economy of Power-Sharing in Post-Conflict Situations
Final Report Abstract
How does power-sharing affect resource allocation between elites and constituencies in post-conflict situations? In the research project “Political Economy of Power-Sharing”, we developed the argument that the type of power-sharing affects sub-national resource allocation patterns. Our main theoretical argument is that power-sharing provides an opportunity for former conflict actors to access state resources and distribute those resources strategically to their constituencies. This theoretical model gave rise to the following three research questions and related findings: 1. Does power-sharing between government and rebels shape sub-national resource allocation in post-conflict situations? On the macro-level, we find that power-sharing cabinets substantively increase corruption in post-conflict countries. We also find that this corruption frequently manifests itself in preferential resource redistribution to the ethnic constituencies of conflict actors. We specifically find patterns of preferential resource allocation as a result of power-sharing in a set of African post-conflict countries as well as in postconflict Aceh, Indonesia. 2. What are the causal mechanisms linking different types of power-sharing to patterns of resource allocation between government and rebel constituency regions and other regions? First, we find that redistribution varies with portfolio composition of the power-sharing cabinet. We find a more pronounced effect of more important cabinet portfolios, suggesting that more important positions in a power-sharing cabinet are also the most important ones, when it comes to redistribution. Moreover, we do not find robust evidence that power-sharing and preferential resource redistribution has a lasting effect on individual perceptions of grievances. So, while redistribution occurs, these economic peace dividends do not seem to “trickle down” to the broader population. 3. What are the implications of power-sharing as an institutionalized instrument for patronage and redistribution on post-conflict democracy and peace? We show that preferential resource redistribution is used by government and rebel elites to exert political control over a post-conflict setting and subdue potential challenges to their rule. Second, we show how power-sharing and resource redistribution enables former conflict actors to engage in clientelistic mobilization in post-conflict elections. This finding was supported by the field work in Aceh, Indonesia, as originally planned. Third, we establish a link between power-sharing, resource redistribution, and democratization. Power-sharing elites are likely to hold free and fair elections, but the quality of the resulting democracies is rather low. These findings not only contribute to our theoretical understanding of how institutions work in post-conflict countries, but also have important implications for practitioners working in countries after war. At the most general level, our findings consistently demonstrate that there is a trade-off between post-conflict peace and corruption: a power-sharing deal might be useful to “buy out” certain warfaring elites by granting them a piece of the economic peace dividends that exist in the post-conflict country. But, at the same, time institutionalizing this access through a power-sharing deal can cement systems of patronage politics that might be detrimental to long-term democratization and stability. Being aware of these tradeoffs is important for decisions over aid allocation in fragile post-war situations including power-sharing.
Publications
- 2015. “Buying Peace? The Political Economy of Power-Sharing.” GIGA Focus International 9
Haass, Felix, and Martin Ottmann
- 2017. “Demokratie lässt sich nicht kaufen: Friedenskonsolidierung in Afrika.” GIGA Focus Afrika 5
Haass, Felix
- 2017 “Does Peace Trickle Down? Micro-Level Evidence from Africa.” OSF Preprints
Ottmann, Martin and Felix Haass
(See online at https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/j8s5q) - 2017. “Buying Democracy? The Political Economy of Foreign Aid, Power- Sharing Governments, and Post-Conflict Political Development.” Dissertation. Universität Greifswald
Haass, Felix
- 2017. “Profits from Peace. The Political Economy of Power-Sharing and Corruption.” World Development 99: 60–74
Haass, Felix, and Martin Ottmann
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.07.006) - 2020. “Peace for Our Time? Examining the Effect of Power-Sharing on Postwar Rebellions.” Journal of Peace Research 57(5): 617–31
Ottmann, Martin
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319883676) - 2021. “Rebels, Revenue and Redistribution: The Political Geography of Post-Conflict Power-Sharing in Africa.” British Journal of Political Science 51(3): 981–1001
Haass, Felix, and Martin Ottmann
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000474) - 2021. “The Democracy Dilemma. Aid, Power-Sharing Governments, and Post-Conflict Democratization.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 38(2): 200–223
Haass, Felix
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894219830960) - 2022. “The Effect of Wartime Legacies on Electoral Mobilization after Civil War.” The Journal of Politics. 84(3), 1322-1336
Haass, Felix, and Martin Ottmann
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1086/718976)
