A frame-theoretic investigation of the dynamics of scientific theories, their conceptual systems and their realistic reference
Final Report Abstract
The project focused on answering the following three questions: (1) How can competing, and in some cases 'incommensurable', theories or research programs be compared? Answer: We argued that frame-theory is well suited for providing in-depth and intuitively accessible comparisons. To support this point we reconstructed some theory-parts in frame-theoretic terms. (2) To what extent do successful and successive scientific theories exhibit continuity of theoretical content? Answer: We argued that robust continuity at the theoretical level exists and it takes the form of structural correspondence relations between the outdated and the contemporarily accepted theory. To be precise, we demonstrated this claim with two case studies, namely the transition from the phlogiston to the oxygen theory of combustion and the transition from the caloric to the kinetic theory of heat. In both cases we found evidence that supports structural realism. This and related views and arguments were further explored and developed. (3) Which theoretical terms or nodes in a theory-frame can be regarded to successfully refer to entities in the world? Answer: We argued that successfully referring theoretical terms or nodes in a theory-frame can be identified when at least part of their content survives theory change in the form of structural correspondence relations between the frames of consecutive theories.
Publications
- (2008) Report ‘Theoretical Frameworks and Empirical Underdetermination’, The Reasoner, 2008, vol. 2(6): 5-6
Votsis, I.
- (2008) Review of Yemima Ben-Menahem’s Conventionalism, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, vol. 39(1): 234-237
Votsis, I.
- (2009) Report ‘Theoretical Frameworks and Empirical Underdetermination’, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, vol. 40 (1):137-140
Votsis, I.
- (2009) Review of Anjan Chakravartty’s A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable, Analysis, vol. 69(2):378-380
Votsis, I.
- (2009) When Empirical Success Implies Theoretical Reference: A Structural Correspondence Theorem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 60.2009, Issue 1, pp. 101-133.
Schurz, G.
(See online at https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axn049) - (2011) Editorial introduction to scientific realism quo vadis? Theories, structures, underdetermination and reference. Synthese
Volume 180. 2011, Issue 2, pp 79-85.
G. Schurz, I. Votsis
(See online at https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9610-0) - (2011) Everything you Always Wanted to Know about Structural Realism but Were Afraid to Ask. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1. 2011, Issue 2, pp 227-276.
Frigg, R. and I. Votsis
(See online at https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13194-011-0025-7) - (2011) How not to be a Realist. In D. Rickles (ed.), Structural Realism. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 77.2011, pp 59-76, Springer
Votsis, I.
(See online at https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2579-9_3) - (2011) Saving the Intuitions: Polylithic Reference. Synthese, Vol. 180.2011, Issue 2, pp 121-137.
Votsis, I.
(See online at https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9601-1) - (2011) Structural Correspondence between Theories and Convergence to Truth. Synthese, Vol. 179. 2011, Issue 2, pp 307-320.
Schurz, G.
(See online at https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9784-5) - (2011) Structural Realism: Continuity and its Limits. In A. Bokulich and P. Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism, (Boston Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science), Springer, pp. 105-117.
Votsis, I.
(See online at https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9597-8_6) - (2011) ‘The Prospective Stance in Realism’, Philosophy of Science, vol. 78(5): 1223-1234
Votsis, I.
- (2012) A Frame-Theoretic Analysis of Two Rival Conceptions of Heat. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, Vol. 43. 2012, Issue 1, pp. 105–114.
Votsis, I., G. Schurz
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.10.010) - ‘Reconstructing Scientific Theory Change by Means of Frames. In: Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen (eds.), Frames and Concept Types. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, Vol.94.2013, pp 93-109, Dordrecht: Springer
Schurz, G., I. Votsis
(See online at https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01541-5_4)
