Information aggregation and the role of transfers in mechanism design (B01)

• Subject Area: Economic Theory
• Term: since 2018
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 326731373

Mechanism design provides methodological underpinnings for a very broad range of institutional design and regulation problems. The presence of monetary transfers is the main facilitator for modulating incentives. By contrast, we combine methods and insights from both mechanism design and social choice to solve optimality questions in settings without money. In addition, we contribute to other fundamental aspects of mechanism design such as informed-principal problems, multidimensional design, and equivalence between mechanisms.

• DFG Programme: CRC/Transregios
• Subproject of: TRR 224: Economic Perspectives on Societal Challenges: Equality of Opportunity, Market Regulation, and Financial Stability
• Applicant Institution: Universität Mannheim
• Project Heads: Professor Dr. Benny Moldovanu; Professor Dr. Thomas Tröger