Reasoning with conditionals in a qualitative cognitive framework
Final Report Abstract
The importance of conditional reasoning as a research topic in both philosophy and psychology has been established in the past 50 years beyond any doubt. The project investigated formal models of human reasoning with conditionals. The project's analyses were mainly based on variations and extensions of the Ramsey test for conditionals (after F. P. Ramsey 1929) against the background of a qualitative framework for belief revision. The project addressed (1) the idea of relevance in conditionals, (2) the connection between conditionals and causal statements, and (3) an inference-ticket interpretation of conditionals that elaborates on an idea of G. Ryle (1950). According to the qualitative reading of the Ramsey test, a conditional 'If A then C' is accepted in a belief state if and only if its consequent C is accepted in the (hypothetical) revision of this belief state by the antecedent A. Concerning topics (1) and (2), the analyses have been implemented using variations of this idea employing either (i) the contrast between revisions by A and revisions by not-A (the "Relevant Ramsey Test") or (ii) a hypothetical suspension of belief regarding A and C individually (the "Strengthened Ramsey Test"). The statics and dynamics of belief states were modelled on the basis of classical AGM-style belief revision, of prioritised belief bases, and of models of structural equations as they are common in the analysis of causation. Combinations of the qualitative framework with ranking-theoretic and probabilistic models of belief states were explored, and models for the learning of conditional information were proposed. In part (3) of the project, explanations for alleged anomalies of human reasoning with conditionals were offered.
Publications
- "Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the Concept of Belief", Synthese 194 (2017), 2695–2720
Rott, Hans
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1032-1) - "Preservation and Postulation: Lessons from the New Debate on the Ramsey Test", Mind 126/502 (2017), 609–626
Rott, Hans
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw028) - "Stability and Scepticism in the Modelling of Doxastic States: Probabilities and Plain Beliefs", Minds and Machines 27 (2017), 167–197
Rott, Hans
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-016-9415-0) - "A Ramsey Test Analysis of Causation for Causal Models", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2018
Andreas, Holger, und Mario Günther
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axy074) - "From Probabilities to Categorical Beliefs: Going Beyond Toy Models", Journal of Logic and Computation 28 (2018), 1099–1124
Douven, Igor und Hans Rott
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exy017) - "Difference-making Conditionals and the Relevant Ramsey Test", Review of Symbolic Logic, 2019
Rott, Hans
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020319000674) - "On the Ramsey Test Analysis of `Because’", Erkenntnis 84 (2019), 1229–1262
Andreas, Holger, und Mario Günther
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0006-8) - "Probabilities, Coherent Belief and Coherent Belief Changes", Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 87 (2019), 259–291
Cantwell, John, und Hans Rott
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-019-09649-3) - "Unstable Knowledge, Unstable Belief", Logos and Episteme 10 (2019), 395–407
Rott, Hans
(See online at https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910436) - "Causation in Terms of Production", Philosophical Studies 177 (2020), 1565–1591
Andreas, Holger, und Mario Günther
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01275-3)
