Systems of epistemology in classical Indian philosophy: Prajñakaragupta (ca. 750-810) on the number of instruments of knowledge (pramana)

• Applicant: Professorin Dr. Birgit Kellner
• Subject Area: Asian Studies
• Term: from 2012 to 2017
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 226063163

Epistemology becomes a major branch of classical Indian philosophy in the course of the first millenium CE. Within the individual religio-philosophical systems such as the Nyyya, the Mymyysy, the Vaiyeyika, the Syykhya, as well as in Buddhist and Jain milieus, divergent approaches are taken to positing distinct „instruments of knowledge“ (Sanskrit pramana). These instruments, among which feature most prominently sense-perception and inference, are held to establish particular objects (prameya); they provide the basis for reliable and truthful knowledge. As epistemological thinking develops, controversies intensify as to how many instruments of knowledge there should be, and what kinds of objects they establish. These controversies effectively constitute an emerging discourse on the nature and boundaries of epistemological systems. They have hardly been touched upon in contemporary research, neither in philological and historical terms, nor in view of their more general philosophical implications. Their investigation will not only shed light on a hitherto dark area of classical Indian philosophy, but can be expected to provide further insights into the purpose of theories and systems of pramana in general, and possibly provide stimuli for further-reaching reflections on the nature and possibilities of epistemological system-buildings. Dignyga (ca. 480-540), the founder of a distinct logico-epistemological tradition in Buddhism, was probably the first to put forward a fundamental claim that the number of instruments of knowledge was limited: There are only two kinds of instruments of knowledge, perception and inference, because there are only two kinds of objects, the particular and the universal. Perception exclusively apprehends the particular, and inference exclusively apprehends the universal. With Dharmakyrti (ca. 600-660), the next great representative of the pramana tradition in Buddhism, the restriction of the number of instruments of knowledge becomes inextricably bound up with ontological questions. Within the long tradition of Buddhist epistemological discourse, this project concentrates on the contributions of Prajñykaragupta (ca. 750-810), one of the most original thinkers after Dharmakyrti, to the discourse on the number of instruments of knowledge. On the basis of newly accessible manuscript materials, the central section on this topic from Prajñykaraguptays Pramanavarttikalankarabhasya, a commentary on Dharmakyrtiys Pramanavarttika, will be critically edited, translated and studied in light of the overarching question how epistemological systems were construed and defended in classical Indian philosophy, and how ontological questions and disagreements affect controversies on the nature and character of systems of epistemology.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants