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Projekt Druckansicht

Policy matters but why? Explaining non-compliance with European law across sectors

Fachliche Zuordnung Politikwissenschaft
Förderung Förderung von 2011 bis 2018
Projektkennung Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Projektnummer 214580577
 
Erstellungsjahr 2019

Zusammenfassung der Projektergebnisse

There is a growing body of research on noncompliance with EU law. Most studies seek to find out why some member states violate EU laws more frequently than others. The literature has paid far less attention to the question of why member state noncompliance is concentrated in particular policy sectors. Part of the reason is a lack data to map sector-specific noncompliance and of adequate theories to explain possible variation. The project set out to fill the empirical and theoretical gap. It compiled a database with more than 13,300 violations of EU law the EU officially recorded between 1978 and 2019 (March). As the most comprehensive database on noncompliance with EU law to date, the Berlin Infringement Database (BDI) allows for analyzing variation in noncompliance not only across policy sectors, but also across member states, time, type of legal act, and type of violation. The data of the BID reveal that noncompliance in the EU is concentrated in only four policy sectors: Environment, Justice & Home Affairs, Information Society & Media, and Health & Consumer Protection. Following Theodore Lowi’s famous dictum that policy determines politics, the project develops one of the first attempts to theorize sector-related noncompliance in the EU. It argues that regulatory policy produces higher compliance costs than non-regulatory policy. (Re-)distributive policy is also costly but the costs arise in decision-making, not in implementation. Regulatory policy is particularly costly if it is market-correcting rather than market making. Harmonizing national standards to protect EU citizens against failures of the Internal Market requires institutional and behavioral change in the member states, which are costly and more likely to give rise to political conflict. The findings of the project have informed the building of a general theory of noncompliance, which not only explains why noncompliance with EU law varies across policy sectors. It also provides answers for why some member states violate EU law more frequently than others and why noncompliance has been declining over the past 20 years, despite a growing body of EU law and an increasing number of member states that have to comply with it. By focusing on the increasing relevance of political conflict over the EU and its laws, the theoretical arguments and empirical findings of the project have important implications of for the effectiveness and legitimacy of the EU, and international governance more broadly. The increasing politicization of international trade, security, or climate change policy shows the limits of international regulation in dealing with redistributive issues. International institutions lack sufficient tax and spending capacity to engage in meaningful redistribution. At the same time, they increasingly constrain states in making social adjustments to compensate those of their citizens that do not profit from globalization. The rise of nationalist movements and populist parties in Europe and the US challenging the liberal foundations of Western societies and the international order alike, may be the harbingers of post-regulatory politics. States need to tackle redistribution directly and decide who gets what in a transparent and accountable way instead of leaving this decision to independent agencies or the global markets.

Projektbezogene Publikationen (Auswahl)

 
 

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